Abstract
Introduction
The European Union's cultural policy was formalised in Article 128 of the Treaty of the European Union, which is commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty. However, prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the European Community was involved in various activities within the cultural realm. In 1977, the Commission presented initiatives relevant to the cultural sector, thereby starting a 'discursive journey' that culminated in Article 128 and manifested in what is referred to here as the first generation of the EU's cultural programmes. I will account for this discursive journey as it is instrumental in understanding the contours of what was to be known as Raphaël, Ariane and Kaleidoscope. Later, these programmes merged into the Culture 2000 programme, which was replaced by the Culture 2007 programme. The current programme, however, did not only change its name but also its scope, as the Creative Europe programme also includes the audiovisual sector and therefore what were previously known as the EU's Media programmes. The Creative Europe programme is thus the European Commission's framework programme within the culture and audiovisual sectors and represents for the first time a common framework for both sectors.
The aim of this paper is to account for the discursive journey of the EU's cultural policy and how these discourses are reflected in the EU's cultural programmes. What are the dominant discourses that can be detected in the regulations that constitute the programmes, and how do these programmes form intertextual and interdiscursive associations with the EU's formal cultural policy and the informal policy-making prior to the Maastricht Treaty?
Method
Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis is the chosen method as it is suitable for illuminating the intertextual and interdiscursive associations between different documents that constitute the framework programmes, as well as being attentive to how ideological and hegemonic factors affect systems of knowledge, thereby revealing the dominant discourses and objectives that arise from the documents. In terms of the context of this article, interdiscursivity and intertextual chains are important as they 'specify what discourse types are drawn upon in the discourse sample under 1
Early formations
As previously mentioned, a discursive journey can be detected as early as 1977 when the Commission presented concrete initiatives for the cultural sector. However, as the cultural
1
The discussion of the informal 'pre-Maastricht' cultural negotiations and the manifestation of the first three generations of EU programmes refers to a prior study that I conducted and offers a detailed account of EU cultural and media policies (see further Valtysson 2008) Croatian International Relations Review -CIRR -XXIV (82) 2018, 14-37 sector was not yet formally included in treaties, the Commission had to discursively circumvent specific concepts and frame its intervention in a 'non-cultural' manner: 'The Communication does not deal with the arts themselves; nor does it expound a policy. Its main emphasis is on how to improve the economic and social situation of all those who, in one way or another, are constantly engaged in artistic creation' (Bulletin of the European Communities 11/1977: 13) . In a further discussion of what constitutes this 'economic and social situation', the Commission frames its intervention with regard to the help 'to overcome the difficulties besetting the people ('cultural workers') and undertakings (publishing houses, theatres, concert societies, cinema chains, etc.) engaged in producing and distributing "cultural goods and services" (13). Thus, by not talking about artists but cultural workers, and by not talking about culture but the cultural sector, the Commission sets the stage for how the initial discourses concerning culture and the EU were formed. These discourses took shape over time, and in this context the EC Bulletin supplement from 1977, called Community Action in the Cultural Sector, is of particular importance, as it defines the community's understanding of the cultural sector: 'The cultural sector may be defined as the socio-economic whole formed by persons and undertakings dedicated to the production and distribution of cultural goods and services. Community action in the cultural sector is therefore necessarily centred on solving the economic and social problems which arise in the sector as in all others -sometimes, even in more acute form. Firstly, it aims to support culture by gradually creating a more propitious economic and social environment' (Bulletin of the European Communities -Supplement 6/1977: 5). Community action insists upon emphasising the cultural sector's role from an economic and social point of view, maintaining that '[j]ust as the 'cultural sector' is not in itself 'culture', Community action in the cultural sector does not constitute a cultural policy' (5).
Another established, along with poetry projects, large art exhibition projects and the establishment of a European network of film distribution.
However, the dilemma of 'camouflaging culture' is still prevalent, as is clearly marked in the introduction to the Communication from 1977, where the President for the Commission of the European Communities, Gaston E. Thorn, maintains that the Communication does not contain a philosophy of culture, as that would indeed indicate ideological and aesthetic priorities. The same kinds of discourses therefore surface in this delicate balance of not stepping into the legal domain of the Member States and respecting the lawful treaty of the Community: '[I]nstead of speaking about "artists" we speak about "cultural workers". This is intended to show that the Community is concerned with creators (writers, composers, painters…) and performances (actors, musicians, singers and dancers…) seen in terms of their social situation as employees or self-employed people and not of their artistic personality which is their business and theirs alone' (5).
Even though the Commission intends these early formations to be free of ideology and aesthetic considerations, it is clearly not successful in these endeavours. Indeed, in these excerpts it is quite clear that in ideological terms there is focus on cultural and audiovisual industries, not only from a structural point of view but also in facilitating 'the distribution of films to be selected at a European Film Festival' (13) and to 'balance the American majors' (13). Furthermore, the re-emerging focus on cultural heritage, widening the audience and ensuring free trade in cultural goods are clear indicators of how a strategy is changing into a policy, despite the Commission maintaining otherwise: 'There is no pretension to exert a direct influence on culture itself or to launch a European cultural policy; what stronger Community action in the cultural sector means in effect is linking its four constituents -free trade in cultural goods, improving the living and working conditions of cultural workers, widening the audience and conserving the architectural heritage -more closely to the economic and social roles which the Treaty assigns to the Community, to the resources -mainly legislative -that it provides, and to the various Community policies (vocational training, social and regional policies) ' (14) .
What these early formations can be said to be characterised by is an instrumental cultural policy which in Vestheim's terms means 'to use cultural ventures and cultural investments as ' (1994: 65; italics in original) , where the 'instrumental aspect lies in emphasizing culture and cultural venture as a means, not an end in itself' (65). Ahearne's distinction of explicit and implicit cultural policy is also useful; particularly in the way the Community makes use of the culture concept. According to Ahearne, the explicit version 'will often identify 'culture' quite simply with certain consecrated forms of artistic expression, thereby deflecting attention from other forms of policy action upon culture ' (2009: 144) . The implicit version is broader and accounts for the 'unintended cultural side effects of various kinds of policy and those deliberate courses of action intended to shape cultures but which are not expressly thematised as such' (144). Interestingly, the EU's cultural policy was born implicitly as it focused from the very start on economically induced discourses referring to 'cultural workers' and 'creators as employees'.
During the 1980s, the member states' cultural ministers initiated an intergovernmental forum that had culture under its auspices, and here there was particular focus on the audiovisual sector. This is manifested for instance in a resolution that concerns the European Cinema and Television Year for 1988. In this resolution, it is maintained that 'the audiovisual media are among the chief means of conveying information and culture to the European citizen and contribute to the strengthening of the individual European cultures, as well as the European identity' (OJ C 320, 13.12.1986: 4) . Furthermore, it is maintained that 'Europe must be strongly represented in the making and distribution of audiovisual products, thus contributing to laying the foundations of an ever closer union amongst [sic] the peoples of Europe' (4). It is quite clear that the separation between ideological and aesthetic dimensions of culture and the 'four constituents' is difficult to maintain as, on an ideological level, culture is clearly meant to serve as a vehicle to provide 'the people of Europe' with a certain 'European identity' as the substance of the community's cultural policy starts to take shape. The Council in fact also adopted three other resolutions relating to Europe's architectural heritage, business sponsorship of cultural activities, and conservation of works of art and artefacts. Also prevalent are discourses that put forward economic objectives in the form of cultural tourism, or in the more indirect instrumental use of culture.
Simultaneously with the emphasis on the economic instrumental use of culture, however, political objectives are 1985: 106) . Here the blueprint for the Union's slogan 'unity in diversity' is slowly emerging. Another interesting stepping stone is the community's acceptance of the 'single market' , which pushed economic agendas further to the forefront. These can clearly be seen in the framework programme for 1988-1992 called A Fresh Boost for Culture in the European Community. Carlo Ripa di Meana's introduction states that cultural activities are political, social and economic necessities which are important to complete the internal market and for the progression from a people's Europe to a European Union. Culture is therefore clearly framed in an instrumental fashion to further economic and political objectives; the economic advantages of the single market are to infuse the European population with a sense of a shared European identity: 'Europe's cultural identity is nothing less than a shared pluralistic humanism based on democracy, justice and freedom. Expressed in the diversity of our local, regional and national cultures, it is the basis for the European Union, which has goals other than economic and social integration, important though these may be. And it is this sense of being part of a European culture which is one of the prerequisites for the solidarity which is vital if the advent of the large market -and the resulting radical changes in living conditions within the Community -is to secure the popular support it needs' (Bulletin of the European CommunitiesSupplement, 4/1987: 5).
However, even though di Meana's foreword opens up an alternative way of framing the EU's cultural policy, the Communication clearly promotes the same discourses as mentioned earlier: 'In discharging its economic, social and legal responsibilities, the Commission will pay particular attention to the free movement of cultural goods and services; better living and working conditions for those engaged in cultural activities, the creation of new jobs in the cultural sector in association with the expansion of tourism and regional and technological development, and the emergence of a cultural industry which will be competitive within the Community and in the world at large' (7).
The cultural article Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, discourses on the cultural sector were shaped by economic and political instrumentalisation, where the cultural and audiovisual sectors were primarily seen through the lens of the single market, and the emphasis was on promoting political integration and specific European values based on Europe's cultural heritage. These objectives also mirror the formal cultural article in the Treaty, as manifested in its first paragraph: 'The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore' (OJ C 191, 29.7.1992: 24) . This paragraph in turn reflects the EU slogan 'unity in diversity' in a cultural context, and the common cultural heritage is seen as a means to unite peoples, at the same time respecting the principle of subsidiarity in terms of regional and national diversity. Paragraph 2 has equally strong interdiscursive connections to older documents of cultural significance, as it mirrors the areas that were regarded as favourable to cultural policy intervention: 'Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas: -improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples; -conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance; -non-commercial cultural exchanges; -artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector'.
Even though minor adjustments have been made to Article 128, which became Article 151 with the Amsterdam Treaty and later 167 with the Treaty of Lisbon, no changes were made in the two first articles where the actual content of the policy is defined. In this context, paragraph 4 in Article 167 from the Treaty of Lisbon is of considerable interest as it plays on Ahearne's distinction between implicit and explicit understandings of culture: 'The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures' (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012: 122) . This paragraph takes an implicit and somewhat extremely wide understanding of culture which, as Gordon maintains, causes conceptual fuzziness amongst EU Commissioners responsible for culture 'who generally merge specific and much broader meanings of 'culture' (Gordon 2010: 110) .
What lies at the heart of such cultural understanding is the EU's emphasis on 'unity in diversity' and how this somewhat paradoxical statement is directly written into the EU's cultural policy, bringing common cultural heritage to the fore at the same time as respecting the national and regional cultural diversity of the Member States. Sassatelli (2009) , in her discussion of the narratives of European cultural identity, maintains that the 'unity' narrative resonates with federalist claims and emphasises the common European roots of a culture and identity, a European spirit strongly linked with 'the legacy of Hellenic rationality and beauty, Roman law and institutions, and Judaeo-Christian ethics' (26). The other side of the coin, the one that highlights diversity, is critical towards this idea and emphasises that there can be no European culture in the singular, but many European cultures and identities. This approach also takes into account the fact that, even though there might be general acceptance of common, wide-reaching values, such values ought to be seen as universal rather than European. Here, Sassatelli takes human rights and democratic principles as examples. However, even though Sassatelli is quite clear in her conceptualisation of the two extremes, i.e. unity and diversity, it becomes much more unclear when she tries to bring the two together. Shore (2001) , in a similar fashion, offers a critical account of this cultural policy motif, 'unity in diversity', and calls it vague and elitist, and maintains that this is epitomised in the Union's first generation of cultural programmes. According to Shore, the problem for the EU 'in its attempts to invent Europe at the level of popular consciousness by unifying people around a common heritage is how to do this without marginalising and excluding those "non-European" peoples and cultures that fall outside the European Union's somewhat selective and essentialist conception of Europe's cultural heritage ' (2001: 117) . Shore therefore criticizes the Union for applying a similar approach to what Smith (2001) terms 'constructionist modernism' within nationalism theories, crystalized in the imagined communities of Anderson (1991) and the invented traditions of Hobsbawn (1983) . Shore goes on to claim that 'European Union discourses on culture frequently advance the idea that cultural identities operate like concentric rings and that creating a "European identity" simply entails adding a new layer of authority and belonging over and above existing local/ regional/national layers, like so many Russian dolls ' (2001: 117) .
Finally, Shore remarks that European cultures are engaged in constant processes of negotiation and exchange from which complex formations of culture and identity emerge, and not from a static cultural vision 'confined to matters of heritage, tourism, the media and entertainment industries and the arts' (118). Shore therefore criticizes the EU's cultural policy for applying a narrative of national cultures in supra-national settings in order to create a supra-national construction of elitist art and selected cultural heritage. At the same time, Shore is attentive to the Union's emphasis on the media and cultural industries. However, as Gordon claims, the challenges the EU faces in its intersection with the cultural field is not only due to conceptual fuzziness but also to the way cultural policy is structured within the EU.
The Commission is the 'agenda-setter' as it initiates the proposals for the cultural programmes. This means that the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the CoR and the EESC all react to the Commission's proposals. As will be apparent in the analysis, this is frequently detected at the textual level (Fairclough 1992) , where specific formulations are negotiated. However, it rarely happens that these textual changes lead to significant changes in discourse practice and social practice. The reason is that the discourses which the Commission initiates are dominant. Certainly, when tracing the institutional process from proposal to law, numerous changes are made all along the line, but no major ideological shifts occur.
It is not just the relevant EU institutions, however, that define the contours of the EU's cultural policy; as Dewey (2010) notes, many EU strategies, such as the Lisbon Strategy, the Bologna process, media policies, cohesion policies and Structural Funds often drive implicit cultural polices and provide more funding for the cultural sector than the cultural policies and programmes are specifically designed to do. This is of course explicitly written in paragraph 4 of the cultural article and directly affects cultural programmes like Culture 2007 and Creative Europe, particularly through Structural Funds. However, Dewey also draws attention to the cultural article's paragraph 5, which lists the decision-making procedures within the EU, as well as how the EU's cultural policy relates to the cultural policies of its Member States: 'As a policy area in the EU, culture is officially a competence shared with the member states, although EU-level competence in culture is negligible and restricted to certain actions. Member states hold authority for their own cultural policy development, and the EU may not exert direct, active cultural policy influence on member states or dictate harmonization of cultural policy at the nation-state level' (115). Therefore, Dewey maintains that, internally, the EU's cultural policy can be perceived as 'low politics', which involves 'soft law instruments' and soft power in international relations. This view is shared by Bell and Oakley (2015) who perceive discrepancies in the rhetoric and general visions of EU cultural policy and their actual execution: 'The move from this rather selective account of Europe's past to actual policymaking is often clumsy and complicated, not least because the EU's institutional structures -the Council, Commission and Parliament -are sometimes at cross-purposes and indeed at odds with the interests of member states' (159).
Another relevant point is that culture and cultural policy have never been excessively promoted and prioritised, as Dewey's soft power notion indicates, because it is difficult to measure its effect, particularly when paragraph 4 of the cultural article is taken into account. This can also be seen when looking at how much funding is allotted to the field, but as Gordon (2010) demonstrates, at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, only 0.06% of the Community's total budget was allocated to designated cultural budgets. However, this informs quite well the point already made, that culture is used in an instrumental fashion politically, to invent European traditions and narratives based on selected readings of cultural heritage, and economically, as a means to boost the cultural and audiovisual industries.
These discourses were exemplified in two communications from the Commission leading up to the actual first generation of the Culture programme, Cultural Action in the European Community: New Orientations Envisaged and New Prospects for Community Cultural Actions. In the New Orientations, this emphasis on uniting the people and uniting the economy resurface, as it is claimed that '[a]s an essential element of the concept of citizen's Europe, this cultural dimension contributes to an awareness of a common sense of identity' (SEC 1991 (SEC 2121 and that this cultural dimension 'should take into account the imminent deadline of the Single Market and its implication for culture in Europe as well as arts sectors for which a Community action is envisaged' (3). Much space is therefore given to a section on the Cultural Single Market. Other sections include the development of common areas with cultural aspects and here, emphasis is on cultural heritage, books and reading. These topics are further developed in the New Prospects where programmes supporting artistic and cultural activities with a European dimension, cultural heritage and translation of European literature and the audiovisual sector are highlighted as important areas. These were later to become the EU's first generation of cultural programmes: Kaleidoscope, Raphaël, Ariane.
The cultural programmes
Kaleidoscope focused its support on artistic and cultural activities with a European dimension and particularly encouraged partnerships, network creations and large-scale European collaborative projects. Raphaël was a programme specifically tailored for the field of cultural heritage, again with an emphasis on transnational cooperation, to improve access, conservation and restoration of cultural heritage of European importance. Lastly, Ariane supported books and reading, focusing on cooperative projects, translation of literary works, training of professionals and prizes relevant to the field. In general terms, this first generation of EU cultural programmes was criticised for being bureaucratic and requiring a lot of effort for relatively scarce funding. Furthermore, the general application and evaluation process was considered opaque (see Ellmeier 1998 for an early critique). These programmes were later merged into the Culture 2000 programme, which was thereby boosted and promoted as the flagship within the EU's cultural interventions and which, as a result, deserves special attention.
When a further look is taken at the decision that establishes the Culture 2000 programme, the dominant discourses exemplified in early EU cultural sector documents are quite rampant, although culture's intrinsic values are echoed: 'Culture has an important intrinsic value to all people in Europe, is an essential element of European integration and contributes to the affirmation and vitality of the European model of society and to the Community's influence on the international scene' (OJ L 63, 10.3.2000: 1), and '[c]ulture is both an economic factor and a factor in social integration and citizenship; for that reason, it has an important role to play in meeting the new challenges facing the Community, such as globalisation, the information society, social cohesion and the creation of employment' (1).
The aim of the Culture 2000 programme is 'to promote greater cooperation with those engaged in cultural activities by encouraging them to enter into cooperation agreements for the implementation of joint projects, to support more closely targeted measures having a high European profile, to provide support for specific and innovative measures and to encourage exchanges and dialogue on selected topics of European interest' (2). Politically and economically induced discourses surface again in the programme decision, where identity and economic politics stand side by side: 'If citizens give their full support to, and participate fully in, European integration, greater emphasis should be placed on their common cultural values and roots as a key element of their identity and their membership of a society founded on freedom, democracy, tolerance and solidarity; a better balance should be achieved between the economic and cultural aspects of the Community, so that these aspects can complement and sustain each other' (1).
The objectives of the programme are, however, quite diverse as they touch upon promoting cultural dialogue and mutual knowledge of the culture and history of the European peoples, the promotion of creativity and transnational dissemination of culture, and the movement of artists, creators and other cultural operators and professionals and their works. The cultural heritage is highlighted along with an emphasis on socio-economic developments and the 'explicit recognition of culture as an economic factor and as a factor in social integration and citizenship' (3). In the cooperation agreements, one of the criteria for receiving funding is aimed at the 'highlighting of cultural diversity and of multilingualism, promoting mutual awareness of the history, roots, common cultural values of the European peoples and their common cultural heritage' (6). This demonstrates the intertextual and interdiscursive links to prior documents and illustrates that the programme still holds on to the idea of common cultural values and a common cultural heritage. Finally, it is worth noting that the decision establishing the Culture 2000 programme states that the Commission will ensure the cultural measures within other spheres of the Union, explicitly mentioning culture and tourism; culture, education and youth; culture and employment; culture and external relations; cultural statistics; culture and the internal market; culture and research; and culture and the export of cultural goods.
Even though prioritising these topics can be seen to be in tandem with the discursive journey already accounted for, a look at the opinions and resolutions from other EU institutions is informative in detecting what kinds of discursive discrepancies can be identified. In terms of the ideological undertone of the programme, the Parliament suggested an array of changes. It was also sceptical towards the budget and the programme's formal realisation, which it considered lacking in terms of efficiency and transparency. The Parliament proposed to increase the budget from EUR 167 million to 250 million, but in the final decision, it was the Commission's original budget that was confirmed. The Parliament did, however, succeed in pushing forward various amendments in terms of more varied forms of cultural expressions, i.e., it succeeded in making amendments on a textual level but not in terms of the budget or in making changes to the three types of cultural actions singled out for support.
The CoR is also blunt in its criticism, maintaining that more finances are needed, that the application procedures are too bureaucratic, and that the programme is too distant from the European public; finally the CoR warns that EU cultural policy should not be used to promote high impact, large-scale activities, but rather to focus on everyday cultural manifestations which relate to the general public: 'It must be remembered that citizens will not identify with Europe if Europe is not part of their daily lives. Cultural activities might be reduced to a superficial level where the spectacle and ephemeral communication is the beall and end-all of everything and there are no positive longterm repercussions' (OJ C 51, 22.2.1999: 72) .
These interventions by the CoR were, however, not taken into consideration and neither was the Parliament's second attempt to raise the budget. What this demonstrates is that in the case of Culture 2000, the Commission and the Council are manifestly allies, while the Parliament and the CoR are in the position of trying to push through amendments that will reduce the scope and bureaucracy of funding allocation processes, insert pluralism in key definitions and increase the involvement of smaller cultural actors. While particularly the Parliament was successful in implementing amendments, it is clear that these adjustments were relatively insignificant when compared to the Commission's original proposal.
Similar tendencies are perceived regarding Culture 2007, which still retains the main objectives as defined in Culture 2000. Structurally, these have slightly changed, as the aim is to make the programme more user-friendly, open and complete. However, the main objectives remain the same, emphasising transnational mobility of professionals in the cultural sector, encouraging the circulation of works of art and artistic products beyond national borders and promoting intercultural dialogue. Older discourses re-emerge with the notable shift that the cultural industries' role is stated more explicitly: 'An active cultural policy aimed at the preservation of European cultural diversity and the promotion of its common cultural elements and cultural heritage can contribute to improving the external visibility of the European Union' (OJ L 372, 27.11.2006: 1) . And: 'The cultural sector is an important employer in its own right and there is, in addition, a clear link between investment in culture and economic development, hence the importance of reinforcing cultural policies at regional, national and European level. Accordingly, the place of culture industries in the developments taking place under the Lisbon Strategy should be strengthened, as these industries are making an increasingly large contribution to the European economy' (1). Interestingly, the cultural industries are mentioned in relation to the Lisbon Strategy, which again paves the way for implicit cultural policy application.
In terms of institutional differences, the original proposal from the Commission resembles the final Decision, and interestingly, the discrepancies detected during the negotiations of the Culture 2000 programme are not found to the same extent in the Culture 2007 version. This is a sign that the discourses on EU cultural programmes have stabilised between the different EU institutions, as most of the interventions did not concern content but rather structural dimensions and execution. The updated 2007 version can therefore be seen as confirming the dominant discourses detected in the first two generations of EU cultural programmes, which again corresponds quite nicely with the 'discursive journey' already accounted for in relation to pre-Maastricht cultural interventions.
However, even though the cultural programmes are framed in this manner, another 'discursive journey' unfolded within the audiovisual sector. This was, however, as Gordon maintains, not as complex as it was much easier to argue for Community interventions in the audiovisual sector, being predominantly defined in economic terms, or as he puts it, 'as a trading block/regulator the European Community (EC), with its focus on economic integration, already had a history of direct involvement in TV, audiovisual and publishing as legitimate spheres of economic policy and promoting competitiveness' (Gordon 2010: 101) . In terms of broadcasting, the Television without Frontiers directives from 1989 and 1997 are instrumental, as is the amended AVMS directive, which is 2018, supposed to respond to converging processes concomitant to digitisation. These directives can be said to form the regulatory infrastructures for the media programmes that, like the cultural programmes, also went through a similar transition, starting with the Media I programme (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , Media II programme (1996 -2000 , Media Plus (2001 Plus ( -2006 to the Media 2007 programme.
From the very start, the Media programmes were not as ambivalent in terms of political instrumentalism, as the agenda was primarily economic. This is clear from Article 2 in the first Media programme which states that the programme's aim is 'to increase European production and distribution companies' share of world markets' (OJ L 380, 31.12.1990: 38) and 'to contribute, in particular by improving the economic and commercial management abilities of professionals in the audiovisual industry in the Community, and in conjunction with existing institutions in the Member States, to creating conditions which will enable undertakings in that sector to take full advantage of the single market dimension' (38-39). When some of the goals for the Media 2007 programme are scrutinised, it is evident that not much has changed since the establishment of the first programme, at least not on the discursive side. These goals are seen as being to: 'increase the circulation and viewership of European audiovisual works inside and outside the European Union, including through greater cooperation between players' (OJ L 327, 24.11.2006: 14) and to 'strengthen the competitiveness of the European audiovisual sector in the framework of an open and competitive European market favourable to employment, including by promoting links between audiovisual professionals' (14).
As previously mentioned, the current Creative Europe programme merges the cultural and media programmes into one. However, it is important to point out that these sectors have never been totally separate, as already from the informal pre-Maastricht cultural strivings, the cultural and audiovisual sectors were repeatedly mentioned together and later directly written into paragraph 2 of Article 128. All the same, the step taken with the new Creative Europe is decisive as it formalises the symbiosis of these two sectors. When a further look is taken at the decision establishing the programme, the general objectives remain the same: '[T]o safeguard, develop and promote European cultural and linguistic diversity and to promote Europe's cultural heritage ' (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013: 226) and 'to strengthen the competitiveness of the European cultural and creative sectors, in particular of the audiovisual sector, with a view to promoting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth' (226). These general objectives are supported by specific objectives which aim to support European cultural and creative sectors in operating internationally, to promote circulation of cultural and creative works and mobility of cultural and creative players, to strengthen financial capacity of SMEs, to reach new and enlarged audiences, and finally 'to foster policy development, innovation, creativity, audience development and new business and management models through support for transnational policy cooperation ' (226) . The European added value is also predominant where it is anchored clearly within the Europe 2020 Strategy and its flagships initiatives.
Otherwise, a major change from earlier programmes is of course that now they are organized as two sub-programmes, a Media sub-programme and a Culture sub-programme. Concerning the former, no major discursive shifts can be detected as the focus is still on 'facilitating the acquisition and improvement of skills and competences of audiovisual professionals and the development of networks, including the use of digital technologies to ensure adaptation to market development, testing new approaches to audience development and testing new business models' (227), as well as on encouraging business-to-business exchanges and increasing the capacity of audiovisual operators to develop European audiovisual works. What can be perceived as causing a major shift is the emphasis on digital technologies. However, this is not recent and was already a concern in the Media 2007 programme and the AVMS directive.
When the priorities of the Culture sub-programme are scrutinised, a more obvious discursive shift can be detected: '[S]upporting actions providing cultural and creative players with skills, competences and know-how that contribute to strengthening the cultural and creative sectors, including encouraging adaptation to digital technologies, testing innovative approaches to audience development and testing new business and management models' (228). While similar emphasis has certainly surfaced in earlier programmes, this distinctly carves out discourses that predominantly reside within the economic realm. Other priorities argue for supporting international cooperation amongst 'cultural and creative players' (229) audience development as a means of stimulating interest in, and improving access to, European cultural and creative works and tangible and intangible cultural heritage' (229). It is therefore obvious that the old strands from the early pre-Maastricht documents are intertextually related to Creative Europe, and the same can be said for earlier Culture and Media programmes. On the cultural front, the emphasis is still on the circulation of books, as in the case of Ariane; on cultural heritage, as in the case of Raphaël; and on international cooperation within the cultural field, as was the case with Kaleidoscope. On the media front, the emphasis is still on facilitating skills and competencies of audiovisual professionals, on facilitating access to markets and business tools and on increasing the capacity of audiovisual operators to develop European audiovisual works.
However, a discursive shift can be detected regarding the framing of intrinsic values and economic objectives. In the recitals for the Culture 2000 programme, culture's intrinsic values, as previously demonstrated, are explicitly formulated and pushed forward. Significantly, this is taken up again in the actual articles of the Culture 2000 programme. The Decision for Culture 2000 also focuses more on promoting cultural dialogue, mutual knowledge of the culture and history of the European peoples, the highlighting of cultural diversity and in developing new forms for cultural expressions. These are not as prevalent in the recitals for Creative Europe, even though the 2005 UNESCO Convention's emphasis on seeing cultural activities, goods and services as having both an economic and cultural nature, is mentioned. The Commission Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalising world from 2007 is also mentioned in a recital, and even though it underlines the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, it also stresses 'culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework for growth and jobs and culture as a vital element in the Union's international relations' (221). While this ambivalence is detected in the recitals, these are not as obvious in the actual articles, even though there is mention of 'non-market-oriented' activities in the Creative Europe's definition of the cultural and creative sectors.
When a closer look is taken at the discourses used by the EU institutions, the same pattern emerges, as was the case in the Culture 2007 negotiations, i.e., it seems as if the institutions have settled their discursive discrepancies and their interventions were structural, rather than ideological. This comes, however, with a significant exception, namely, that in the original proposal from the Commission, there was no recital on intrinsic values (COM(2011) 785 final). Indeed, it is the Parliament that adds this in its first report on the Commission's proposal: 'The Framework Programme ought to take into account the fact that culture has an intrinsic value that is separate from the economic aspects of cultural goods and services. This duality that culture has should be borne in mind when the Framework Programme is being drawn to ensure that the focus is not placed solely on economic competitiveness ' (A7-0011/2013: 20) . In the final decision constituting Creative Europe, recital 20 is formulated thus: 'The Programme should take into account the dual nature of culture and cultural activities, recognising, on one hand, the intrinsic and artistic value of culture and, on the other hand, the economic value of those sectors, including their broader societal contribution to creativity, innovation and social inclusion' (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013: 223) . Regarding the actual articles concerning the objectives, the Parliament proposes to implement factors that relate to developing a sense of European identity among European citizens. However, this is to no avail, as the alignment between the Commission's proposal and the Decision is quite straightforward. The Parliament's suggestions are taken into account on various occasions, but as already claimed, this is usually a matter of responding to the Commission's text and does therefore not result in any major discursive shifts.
The same can be said for the opinions of CoR and the EESC. The EESC emphasises the cultural and creative sectors' prominent roles in the Europe 2020 Strategy and 'highlights the importance of the economic dimension of the Creative Europe programme and supports the idea that the programme should encourage all operators in the cultural and creative sectors to aspire to economic independence' (OJ C 181, 21.6.2012: 35) . However, even though the EESC is generally favourable to discourses that encourage economic growth, it is also aware of certain discrepancies in the Commission's proposals: 'However, it seems that the programme is overly concerned with the general objective of competitiveness, while the goal of promoting European cultural and linguistic diversity is less visible' (35). Similar concern is shared by the CoR, which in particular takes up elements that concern intrinsic general values of democracy, as it 'feels that culture and art, as well as cultural media and the audiovisual sector, can trigger behavioural changes and have the power to create new social relationships motivating people to use their creative abilities, and that at the same time culture and art can safeguard the values of democratic society' (OJ C 277, 13.9.2012: 158) . However, even though the CoR pays attention to these kinds of discourses, it certainly aligns with the dominant ones, as well as acknowledging that 'by bringing culture and media together, the programme can facilitate the distribution of cultural products, create a single online market for audiovisual works and help unlock the job creation potential of the cultural and creative sectors ' (157) .
Conclusion
This article has accounted for a 'discursive journey' concerning the cultural policy and the cultural programmes of the European Union. This journey started with informal talks, speeches and documents that later proved to be decisive for Article 128 in the Maastricht Treaty. The approach used in this paper is inspired by the critical discourse analysis of Norman Fairclough that emphasises orders of discourse, intertextuality, and interdiscursivity at textual and discourse practice levels. Other theories that touch upon EU cultural and media policy from different perspectives have informed the social practice, i.e., what the consequences of this discursive journey can be said to be. Here, Fairclough focuses on concepts such as power, hegemony and ideology, and when these are applied to the textual analysis, it becomes clear that EU cultural policy and EU cultural programmes were born implicitly, in Ahearne's sense of the concept. What this entails is that as the cultural sector was not an official part of EU policy prior to Maastricht, discourses and corresponding activities within the cultural sector had to be 'camouflaged'. The consequence of this is that from its very start, in ideological terms, there was always attention towards the economic potential of the sector. Later on, political discourses emerged, mainly focusing on a people's Europe and a common cultural heritage. These discourses colour not only EU's cultural article but also the execution of the policy as manifested in the four generations of EU cultural programmes.
The ambition of this article has been to demonstrate this over time, to account for intertextual and interdiscursive relations, as well as institutional power relations between different EU institutions in the negotiation processes of the different programmes. I asked the question as to whether a discursive shift had occurred regarding the cultural programmes, and the answer is affirmative. There is a discursive shift from the first to the fourth generations of EU culture programmes, but this has not happened overnight. The dominant discourses of EU cultural policy have always been coloured in terms of implicit cultural policy, promoting economic and political discourses. Seen through the eyes of cultural policy, this is instrumentalism in Vestheim's sense of the word, as culture and the cultural sector are used to promote other interests. The discursive dilemma of treating culture's 'intrinsic values' is a good example of this. Indeed, in the new Creative Europe, the effects of the EU's 2020 Strategy are quite obvious. It is clear that the cultural and creative sectors have a lot to offer in terms of the creation of jobs and economic growth, and discursively these elements have taken the upper hand in the Creative Europe programme. Indeed, objectives that relate to intrinsic values, cultural diversity, common values and roots, freedom, tolerance and solidarity, which were present in Culture 2000, have been pushed to the periphery. The step taken with the Creative Europe therefore discursively moves further into the economic domain and away from the political instrumentalism that characterised earlier attempts where a people's Europe and the common cultural heritage were celebrated.
However, it would be an overstatement to maintain that the rhetoric has changed. A better way of framing it would be to maintain that the already implicit cultural policy and cultural programmes of the EU have shifted away from political towards economic instrumentalism. In some ways, the Creative Europe is, on a discursive level, more crisp and coherent than its predecessors. This is because the narrative has been simplified and taken back to its roots -to the place were culture from the start was camouflaged.
